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STRATEGY FOR LABOR REVISITED 
SAMUEL ESTREICHER† 
[EDITOR’S NOTE: What follows is an unofficial transcript of an 
off-the-record conversation among three of the labor movement’s 
leading strategists.  The meeting was convened by C, or 
“cooperationist,” who had been for over ten years the president 
of a local union, part of a major industrial union, representing 
3,000 employees who had been hired to staff a new 
manufacturing plant in a Southern town (“Newplant”).  
Newplant had been widely touted as a breakthrough in U.S. 
labor-management relations because it was consciously 
designed to promote greater participation of production and 
maintenance workers in business decisions.  In bitterly 
contested local elections last year, C was voted out of office and 
now serves in a staff capacity at the AFL-CI0.  A, or 
“adversarialist,” a longstanding friend of C, is the research 
director of another industrial union.  A was very active in the 
Students for A Democratic Society in the 1960s, and after 
graduating from Antioch College, began his career as a labor 
organizer, working for a succession of unions that had been 
active in the McGovern-Kucinich wing of the Democratic Party.  
S, or “stay the course,” is the highly respected chief of staff for a 
national union representing government workers.  Section 
headings and citations are supplied by the editor and do not 
appear in the original transcript.] 
 
 
 
 
† Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Director, Center for Labor and 
Employment Law, NYU School of Law. This is a revised, updated version of an 
article (also featuring the technique of a Socratic dialogue) that appeared as Samuel 
Estreicher, Strategy for Labor, 22 J. LAB. RES. 569 (2001). The title is from ANDRE 
GORZ, STRATEGY FOR LABOR: A RADICAL PROPOSAL (1967). © 2010 Samuel 
Estreicher. All rights are reserved. 
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I. SETTING THE STAGE 
C:  We are discussing tonight what if anything could or be 
should be done about the decline of unions in private companies.  
We now represent less than eight percent of private workers;1 
and we have not yet hit bottom.  This has to change if we are 
going to speak for all working people, to be a social movement in 
the true sense and not just another interest group. 
I know we all agree there is a problem, although I suspect we 
are not going to agree on solutions.  It might be useful, at the 
outset, if we stated our initial positions on how we view the 
problem and where we think the solution(s) might be. 
Let me start. 
We’ve just spent a king’s ransom on reelecting Obama and 
stymeing the Republican-Tea Party assault, not to mention tens 
of thousands of hours of manpower simply getting out the vote.  
For the first two years of the first Obama administration, we had 
a Democratic Congress and President; only the Senate and the 
White House for the last two years, where we now stand for 
another four.  Last time around, we pushed hard to pass into law 
the Employee Free Choice Act2—to get bargaining authority on 
the basis of card-checks and a first-time contract through 
arbitration—and these Democrats even though they had sixty 
votes could not break a threatened filibuster or even force a real 
debate on the floor.  This has happened before.  We broke the 
bank electing Clinton and a Democratic Congress in 1992 and 
what did we end up with—a study commission and the FMLA!  
At the end of the day, what is a Democratic administration likely 
to do?  We will never get the changes—card-check certification, 
repeal of the secondary-boycott and hot-cargo prohibitions, and 
outlawing of permanent replacements of economic strikers—that 
might really make a difference.   
 
 
1 See Economic News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Union Members Summary (Jan. 27, 2012), www.bls.gov/news.release/union2. 
nr0.htm. 
2 See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor 
Relations Act Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 2–4 (2009) 
(discussing proposed Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. 
(2007)). 
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Even if magic occurred, and we could get a Canadian-style 
package over the hump of a likely filibuster, even this kind of 
labor law reform cannot reverse our decline in private companies.  
The Canadian unions have secured into law the AFL-CIO wish 
list, and their unionization rate in private companies keeps 
dropping.3  Sure, we can slow it down with better laws, but we 
cannot reverse the trend without a change in what we do, in 
what we are about. 
We need to go back to basics.  Over the course of our history, 
labor has been viewed by employers and much of the larger 
society as a net cost-adding institution.  We produce value for our 
members—giving them a voice, providing integrity to an inside-
the-firm grievance procedure, establishing portable benefits, and 
so on.  Sometimes we prod managers to improve productivity as a 
means of paying for wage and hour improvements.  But on 
balance the value we provide to employees and the firm is 
outweighed by the costs we add through our traditional 
insistence on industry wages and job controls.  Sam Gompers 
understood this well, and in what we might call “Gompers 101” 
insisted that it is labor’s job to impose the standards set in the 
union sector on nonorganized firms in the same industry, “to take 
wages out of competition” by organizing all product market 
competitors. 
We were able to achieve this objective for several decades, at 
a time when Americans enjoyed a huge domestic market, global 
competition was rare, and our companies in many industries 
enjoyed a nearly oligopolistic position.  The Auto Workers, once 
they organized the three major U.S. producers, in effect 
organized the entire product market.  The Big Three would fight 
us on better wages and benefits, but they all knew that, in the  
 
 
 
3 In 2004, the unionization rate in the Canadian “commercial sector” (which 
excludes public services but includes quasi-governmental Crown corporations and 
the publicly financed healthcare industry) hovered around 20%, where it had been 
29.8% in 1981. See René Morissette et al., Diverging Trends in Unionization, PERSP. 
ON LAB. & INCOME, Apr. 2005, at 5, 6, available at www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-
x/75-001-x2005104-eng.pdf. In the first half of 2009, the private-sector unionization 
rate in Canada dropped to 16.1%. See Unionization, PERSP. ON LAB. & INCOME, Aug. 
2009, at 27, 27, available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/75-001-x2009108-
eng.pdf. 
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end, they would face no competitive disadvantage in agreeing to 
our terms, because we could credibly promise that the very same 
terms would be imposed on all competitors.4   
Those days are gone.  Product and labor markets are now 
global.  Achieving Gompers 101—enormously difficult even in the 
earlier period—is now virtually impossible.5  And I do not believe 
that labor-linked trade rules can significantly change this, for we 
will never be able to impose U.S. labor standards on most 
producers in the developing world.  The “cat is out of the barn”;  
we allowed U.S. industry to farm out production to China and its 
neighbors, and that ain’t coming back.  Perhaps we can impose 
occupational safety rules and get these countries to enforce their 
own laws against child labor, but we will never be able to impose 
our wage and other economic standards.  
In the public sector, we have enjoyed considerable gains, and 
now represent well over a third of all government workers.6  But 
government managers are also, for all practical purposes, 
oligopolists.  Sure, there are limits on how far they can go in 
acceding to union demands, but there is little danger of 
negotiating ourselves out of existence.  Most government services 
are either natural monopolies, like police, fire, and highways, or 
are sheltered from any effective product market competition 
because they will continue to be financed from taxes even in the 
face of widespread dissatisfaction, as in the case of public schools 
in some cities. 
Some Repubican opportunists will try to turn public opinion 
against government labor, but in Wisconsin we forced them to 
relearn the political power of organized labor. 
 
4 See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product 
Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 12 (1993).  
5 See Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local”: Employee Representation in 
a World of Global Labor and Product Market Competition, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81 
(2009).  
6 U.S. public-sector workers have a union membership rate (37.4%) that is over 
five times that of private-sector employees (7.2%) and account for half of total union 
membership, even though government work is only one-fifth the size of the private 
workforce. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union 
Members–2009 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_ 
01222010.pdf. In 2010, total U.S. union membership declined by 612,000 and the 
union membership rate fell to 11.9 % from 12.3% the year before. See Economic 
News Release, supra note 1.  
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We also need to relearn—to remember the lessons of 
Gompers 101.  How can we continue to pursue wage and other 
economic policies that benefit our membership while at the same 
time figuring out ways of reducing the costs of union 
representation for employers?  That, in my view, is the challenge, 
and I hope our discussion today will point out some practical 
approaches. 
A:  We’re old friends, and I respect you despite your 
consistent wrongheadedness.  Labor is never going to get 
anywhere trying to make itself user-friendly to employers.  I am 
no longer a Marxist, but the essential Marxian insight still 
obtains:  The interests of workers are fundamentally adverse to 
those of employers, because labor’s gains are purchased at the 
shareholders’ expense.  Gompers 101 was about imposing costs 
on the nonunion sector, not reducing costs for unionized firms.  
The essential adversity of interest may have been muted in the 
old days, in certain industries, for some of the reasons you give.  
But no longer.  Today, employers are not committed to their 
workers, and are even less committed to their communities.  
They are singlemindedly committed to their executives and 
shareholders. 
Labor is a variable cost; from a human rights perspective it 
should be considered a fixed cost.  The employer’s focus is on 
reducing its dependence on that cost item, by outsourcing, where 
feasible, and if that can’t be done, by reducing the level of that 
cost.  From the employees’ standpoint, however, their jobs 
represent an immobile investment, as people are rooted in their 
homes, their communities.  It is because of that essential 
disparity in leverage—firms can desert workers, but workers (in 
most situations) cannot easily desert their employers—that 
workers cannot fend on their own, unless they have highly 
mobile skills that increase in value with time.  Most of our 
members, and those whom we can plausibly recruit to become 
members, are folks without mobile skills, and whatever skills 
they bring to the job get eroded over time. 
If labor is going to improve its situation, it has to craft 
strategies that flow from this fundamental premise.  We are 
representatives of the dispossessed, and we need to make 
ourselves relevant to the dispossessed. 
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I agree with you, C, that the usual labor politics is not going 
to get us anywhere.  The Wagner Act never would have occurred 
were it not for the social revolution in the mills and offices, the 
imminent explosion in the streets that FDR headed off with the 
NLRA and other New Deal legislation.7  We will never get the 
right labor law until we become a mass movement again, until 
we make clear to the powers that be that our voice cannot be 
silenced.8 
To become a movement again, we have to organize outside of 
the NLRA framework.  Take the SEIU’s “Justice for Janitors” 
program.  The union’s pressure is directed at the users of 
janitorial labor, the high-rise office buildings, not the ostensible 
employers—the cleaning contractors, the thinly capitalized 
operations that do the owners’ bidding.  The owners call the 
shots, and they should feel the pressure.  We can do a good deal 
lawfully, through corporate campaigns, community pressure, and 
the like—until owners find it in their interests to use only union 
contractors.  If this can be done for janitors, who have little skills 
and can be easily replaced, this can be done for a good many 
American workers who have somewhat more mobile skills and 
are not so easily replaced. 
Sure, we cannot legislate foreign competition out of 
existence.  But we can make it more difficult for firms presently 
under union contract to outsource work.  Where we have 
leverage, we can insist on “neutrality” agreements up and down 
the supply and vending chain.  Labor-linked trade rules are 
about slowing down outsourcing abroad, making it more 
expensive.  We have a natural alliance here with 
environmentalists and students.  To borrow from Che: One, two, 
many Seattles! 
S:  It’s great to have this far-ranging discussion.  But I think 
both of you make too much of our declining unionization rate in 
private firms.  That statistic way overstates the potential 
unionization that is possible under current law.  It includes 
people like supervisors and managers who do not have the right 
 
7 See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKER 1933–1941 (1969); IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY (1975). 
8 See JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A 
MOVEMENT 1, 325 (2010). 
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to organize, and highly compensated, highly mobile professionals 
who never will seek collective representation.  If you look at folks 
we are capable of organizing (what I would call “achievable union 
density”), we are doing a pretty good job.  We can do and are 
doing better.  We have now been able for the first time in living 
memory to increase the absolute number of private workers 
under union contract. 
It is a mistake to measure our success solely in terms of the 
unionization rate.  It may not be “Gompers 101,” but it is at least 
“Gompers 102,” that organized labor shouldn’t try to be a mass 
movement.  We are the leading force among working people, 
raising standards for competition among all workers as we seek 
to improve the private interests of our members.  We are also the 
leading force for a civil society.  We have been and can continue 
to be the most effective organization in the country for advancing 
and protecting workers’, indeed all Americans’, rights, even if we 
represent only a small fraction of overall workforce through 
collective bargaining.  No piece of progressive social legislation 
has passed in the last seventy years at least without our political 
leadership; no agency regulation worth the effort is promulgated 
without our expert assistance and insistence.  Sure we want 
more density, but not if it means fundamentally altering either 
our objectives or mode of operation. 
II. TRADE AND EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 
C:  I think we’ve done a good job in setting out our basic 
differences.  Let’s see if we can narrow them somewhat if we 
proceed issue-by-issue. 
Let’s take trade.  Even our standard-bearers from Clinton to 
Obama carry the torch for free trade; and they are not reluctant 
conscripts.  The Democrats do not want to appear anti-consumer 
and they are also funded by corporations; our political allies are 
never going to pursue the kind of aggressive program that we 
need.  If we get anything, it will be some kind of papering over of 
the dispute, some sort of mechanism for raising issues, as in the 
labor side-letter to NAFTA or the labor clause in CAFTA.  In the 
end, the trade barriers will come down further; U.S.-based 
manufacturing will still have to compete with non-U.S. firms—
and increasingly, with nominally U.S. and European companies  
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using contractors in China—who will be able, with increasing 
ease, to produce competitive goods at markedly lower labor costs 
and import them here free of tariffs.  
What we can do is help U.S. manufacturers compete for that 
segment of the market where our employers still have a 
comparative advantage because of the combination of U.S.-
educated workers, U.S. infrastructure, and high-end products. 
How can we help them compete?  We need to be smart about 
what we are about.  We have to drop the old concerns:  We’re not 
about job classifications, penalizing work out of classification, 
grieving over supervisors, and techs doing bargaining-unit work.  
We are (or should be) about being agents of employee voice—
improving communication between managers and employees, 
making sure workplace norms are fairly developed and fairly 
applied, providing the organizational memory and 
representational skills that give integrity to the grievance 
procedure, instilling trust in the negotiated incentive 
compensation plan, and reducing the costs of employment 
disputes. 
U.S. (or foreign) firms are not going to commit new capital to 
U.S. plants unless they can be assured of a competitive return on 
their investments.  They have to reach a certain comfort level 
that U.S. plants will in fact be more productive, that a U.S. 
workforce brings something special to the table that cannot be 
found in Mexico, India, or China, because U.S. workers are 
highly educated and committed to organizational goals. 
We all know of many unionized industrial plants in the 
Midwest that are dead from the waist up, plants that hardly 
have any remaining salvage value.  No new capital has come into 
these plants in decades, or ever will.  That should be no surprise 
if you spend a day on the shopfloor with those demoralized 
workers.  The unions have been complicit here because over the 
years they have made it hard to fire the troublemakers, the 
slackers.  Their focus, like management’s, has been on the 
endgame:  How much can we squeeze out of the sunk, non-
portable assets in these plants? 
A:  I disagree vehemently.  It is not our job to manage or co-
manage.  That is management’s job.  Our job is to represent those 
folks who have no chance ever to reach management’s ranks.  
They are the other, the hourlies, the nonexempt, the 
implementers, the “touch” workers, the front-line workers, the 
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rank and file.  We have to protect their jobs and salaries, if we 
are to be a trade union in any meaningful sense, in any sense 
that can galvanize people to take the risks involved in collective 
representation and struggle. 
Of course, there are places, especially where new facilities 
are being constructed with entirely new work forces, where some 
flexibility is possible.  However, we have to draw the line at any 
programs that compromise seniority, allow standard-less merit 
pay, or enlist the union as a partner in the management function.  
This is about core commitments, not ideological squeamishness.  
If we blur the lines and start taking responsibility for production 
and discipline, our members will not understand where we are 
coming from; they will see us as “being in bed with the boss,” and 
rightly so.  Over the long run, we will have trouble balancing 
these conflicting roles, and in the process will compromise 
ourselves. 
This brings us to trade.  We can’t stop progress, but we can 
stop exploitation.  We have a minimum wage, overtime laws, and 
occupational safety and health and civil rights laws.  These laws 
reflect the judgment of our elected representatives that work 
cannot be performed in this country except in conformity with 
these rules.  We have to insist that these standards reflect the 
minimum conditions of industrial decency under which U.S. 
workers should have to compete with workers anywhere else in 
the world.  We don’t allow South Carolina to undermine the 
federal minimum wage simply because that state believes it 
would be better off if it could attract new plants by paying wages 
below the federal standard.  Why allow China, Indonesia, or the 
Philippines a competitive advantage that we disallow our own 
states on grounds of industrial decency? 
I am not some besotted idealist.  I know that we cannot be 
too rigid here because we want to promote U.S. exports, but these 
rules of industrial decency should be our starting point for trade 
negotiations.  Today, they are simply swept aside in the interest 
of promoting “free trade.”  But trade is no more free than labor is 
“free” if competition occurs without rules of the game, without 
rules of decent competition.  We need rules of fair trade, not free 
trade. 
International trade is about transaction costs.  We have 
more trade today because certain costs—transportation, 
communication—have been reduced as a result of technological 
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improvement.  To slow down the erosive effect of trade on U.S. 
labor standards, we have to increase other costs.  Through 
political pressure, “local content” legislation, collective 
bargaining over outsourcing, and pressure of the sort represented 
by Seattle, we have to make it more expensive for U.S. employers 
to site work outside of the U.S. 
S:  To a large extent, I agree with both of you.  We don’t have 
to choose.  We can make clear to U.S. employers that we are open 
to new approaches.  The Board has opened the door to pre-
recognition discussion of terms; and we should take advantage of 
this opening.9  We are not against employee involvement, team-
based systems, and the like if they are freely negotiated with 
independent labor organizations. 
Without inconsistency, we can continue to fight measures 
that lower trade barriers that do not take account of labor 
standards.  We didn’t want NAFTA, and we would be better off 
without it, but the labor side-letter has had a beneficial effect.  It 
has helped make the Mexican system more transparent, and we 
are seeing the beginnings of an independent trade union 
movement there.  We might also consider establishing U.S. 
affiliates in Mexico to further spur these developments.  I note 
also that recent free trade agreements contain labor-linked 
standards of the sort we wanted in NAFTA. 
III. CONTINGENT WORK 
C:  Maybe it’s overstated, maybe it isn’t, but there is 
certainly a basis for fearing a fundamental change in the U.S. 
labor market.  In many places, workers do not have career 
employment.  Increasingly, they are hired on a “project only” 
basis.  Even if the “project” lasts for a long time, they are not 
employees of the user employer but employees of a referral 
agency or are deemed independent contractors.  Traditional 
union organizing and traditional union objectives assume a 
steady employer and a permanent work force interested in things 
like seniority protection and defined benefit pension plans. 
 
 
9 See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. 49, 8 (2010).  
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Contingent workers cannot be readily organized on an 
industrial basis.  Sure, rulings like Sturgis10 help, and we need to 
get it restored into law, but in most cases the temporary workers 
will not agree to be in a unit with the user employer’s work force 
because they do not share sufficient commonality of interest with 
them.  In some cases, Sturgis may, paradoxically, make it harder 
to organize the user employer’s work force. 
If contingent workers are to be organized in decent numbers, 
we have to renovate the craft-union model.  (I never thought 
those words would come from the lips of an old industrial 
unionist like me.)  We need to provide industry-based or career-
based organizations.  We’ve done this in the construction and 
entertainment industries, and we need to do it in the temporary 
help industry. 
What labor’s experience in the construction and 
entertainment industries suggests is that we have to figure out 
ways we can provide valuable services for temporary workers, 
and ways we can provide benefits to unionized firms that at least 
offset the costs that union wages, benefits, and grievance 
procedures often entail.  
Consider some possibilities.  The construction-trades model 
points to union-provided training services so that people can 
rapidly move beyond the entry level; and a referral system that 
does a better job than manpower companies in maintaining a 
roster of qualified, motivated workers.  The entertainment-union 
model points to career-building services and an information 
clearinghouse informing temporary workers of better 
opportunities elsewhere.  Both models also suggest union 
provision of portable pension and health insurance. 
Can this be done without the law’s help?  A relaxation of the 
pre-hire contract ban would help, as would a change in the “hot 
cargo” clause prohibition allowing us to reach agreements with 
user employers that deal only with those temporary-help 
agencies that recognize career-based unions.  We are not likely to  
 
 
 
 
 
10 See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), overruled by H.S. Care 
L.L.C., 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 659 (2004). 
FINAL_Estreicher (Do Not Delete) 2/21/2013  11:43 AM 
424 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:413   
get such legislation in the near future, and have to do what we 
can on our own.  Maybe this is Gompers 103: voluntarism, doing 
this on our own, without counting on the state to bail us out.11 
A:  I agree with almost everything you said, but I have a 
difference in emphasis.  Where we should focus our efforts is in 
raising the costs of using temporary help, and this can only be 
done by making life as difficult as possible for employers who use 
the services of temporary-help agencies.  One path is to use our 
leverage over the user employers with whom we have contracts 
in order to establish terms under which outsourcing can occur, 
and at the very least to require neutrality agreements from 
companies doing the outsourcing.  Another complementary path 
is to use Sturgis to organize temporary workers in units that also 
include the user employer’s people.  There is a community of 
interest:  The latter want the higher wages and benefit 
improvements that a union contract can bring; the former want 
steady employment with union-scale benefits. 
S:  A very helpful discussion.  It seems we need legislation to 
establish an §8(f)-type provision12 for other industries that, like 
construction, hire people for short-term, project-only 
assignments.  It is doubtful that any time soon, we can get repeal 
of Taft-Hartley’s secondary-boycott prohibition,13 but it would 
seem that we might be able to get some improvement in the hot-
cargo prohibition, to the effect that unions should be able to enter 
into agreements with user employers governing the terms under 
which they will use the services of temporary-help or labor-
supply companies.14  
IV. CARD-CHECK CERTIFICATION 
A:  I want to change the terms of our discussion.  Even 
though EFCA was stalled the last time around, the top priority 
item for the labor movement remains getting card-check 
certification into law.  The issue of whether to have a collective 
bargaining agent and who that agent should be is a matter 
 
11 See Samuel Estreicher, Trade Unionism Under Globalization: The Demise of 
Voluntarism?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 415, 417 (2010).  
12 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (2006). 
13 Id. § 158(b)(4). 
14 See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening 
up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 829 (1996). 
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strictly between the worker and that organization.  The employer 
has no proper role to play in this process.  We don’t allow third 
parties to decide who your lawyer will be if you want to bring a 
divorce proceeding or buy a house.  The employer is no different.  
He is a third party who has no proper role to play in the workers’ 
decision whether to bring in a union. 
Giving the employer a role in representation elections, as the 
law currently allows, is to give the employer an opportunity to 
scare workers away from collective representation, through 
veiled and actual threats and well-timed discharges of union 
supporters.  In essence, the workers have to surmount not only 
the obstacle of agreeing among themselves to have a collective 
agent, they then have to withstand the employer’s lawful and 
unlawful campaign.  It is no surprise we win only fifty percent of 
NLRB elections (even though we normally wait for card 
signatures from seventy percent or more of the work force before 
filing a petition).  What is surprising is that American workers 
have the courage to select a union half of the time. 
The law should adopt the model of the Canadian system: 
certification of a labor organization upon presentation of 
petitions signed by, say, sixty percent or more of the work force.  
No election is necessary.  If the workers ultimately find the 
organization unresponsive, they can decertify or, more likely, 
withhold their support from a strike.  A union that cannot 
galvanize its members will have no effective authority; it will 
disappear from the scene. 
We should make clear to our allies in Congress that this is 
still the “red line” for us.  We need to pressure them to agree that 
no legislation of any kind sought by Republicans that is not 
absolutely essential to the workings of the government, passes 
without a law giving effect to the unkept promise of the Wagner 
Act: the right of self-organization—self-organization, that is, not 
employer-approved organization, not organization requiring 
herculean effort and courage. 
C:  There is a lot in what you say.  It is exceedingly difficult 
to organize in the ways you suggest, but also difficult to remove a 
representative.  The system is really one of “hard in, hard out”— 
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hard to get in a union representative, and hard to remove him.  
You urge in its place a regime of “easy in, hard out,” as in 
Canada.15  
I favor the “easy in” idea but have some reservations about 
the “hard out” feature.  I agree that employers have no right in 
terms of any property or First Amendment right to participate in 
elections, but they have a role to play because they provide 
information workers should have.  They point out the down-side 
of unionization and the down-side of the particular organization 
seeking bargaining authority.  Admittedly, the informational role 
that employers play is problematic because they are likely to 
overstate—or misstate—the negative, even where they do not 
engage in outright threats.  But in the absence of some other 
source of information, it should trouble us that we are asking 
workers to make a decision that effectively could lock them in for 
some time, until they can mount the kind of collective action 
effort necessary to file a decertification petition.  It is not always 
true that an unresponsive union is voted out or walks away; often 
such a union finds a way to make peace with the employer to the 
detriment of the represented employees. 
In place of the “easy in, hard out” approach, I propose “easy 
in, easy out.”16  We can worry less about how informed employees 
are when voting on union representation if we improve the exit 
option.  In lieu of the current rules that only a labor lawyer could 
love (periods of election/certification bar, periods of virtually 
irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions, narrow thirty-day 
window period before new contract kicks in with another three-
year contract bar, and thirty percent showing of interest)17 the 
law should provide for automatic reauthorization elections 
without any showing of interest, say, once every two or three 
years.  In these elections, the employees now armed with some 
information about the actual contract the labor organization has 
 
15 See generally Micah Berul, Revitalizing American Labor through Canadian-
Style Certification Reform: Is It in the Cards?, in GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE 
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT LANDSCAPE: AS WE ENTER THE 21st CENTURY 939 (Samuel 
Estreicher ed., 2000).  
16 See generally Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. 
RES. 247 (2000). 
17 See Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal To 
Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651, 652–53, 692–93, 696 n.270 
(2006). 
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negotiated and the quality of contract administration it provides, 
will be able in secret ballot to decide whether they wish to 
reauthorize the bargaining agent. 
We can also facilitate rival bids on the theory that the best 
way to ensure effective representational services is to create a 
competitive marketplace.  Rival organizations might appear on 
the reauthorization ballot on, say, a ten percent showing of 
interest.  Election dates could be required to be posted on the 
Internet so that interested organizations can keep abreast of 
raiding opportunities. 
An “easy in, easy out” regime also facilitates a change in the 
law with respect to pre-hire agreements.  We can worry less 
about whether a labor organization represents a majority 
preference at the time of recognition, if the employees will have a 
low-cost opportunity to vote in secret on the organization’s 
continued bargaining authority.  
A:  You may be on to something, but a major problem I see is 
that employers hell-bent on frustrating the wishes of their 
employees will dally in bargaining, unwilling to agree even to a 
bare-bones contract, simply letting the two- or three-year clock 
run—at which point inevitable employee frustration will express 
itself in a vote to de-authorize.  I don’t see how “easy in, easy out” 
can work without providing for first-contract interest arbitration 
at least where employers do not bargain in good faith.  That is 
the Canadian model; it is not automatic interest arbitration, as 
EFCA would have provided.18 
C:  You raise a significant concern, and we certainly know 
that under current law employers continue their opposition 
campaign even after certification by not agreeing to a first 
contract.  Remember, however, that we are providing for “easy 
in.”  An employer who plays games of the type you mention not 
only risks alienating his own work force, and in the process 
impelling a work stoppage, but also risks re-organization by 
other labor organizations.  Such an employer will have to think 
long and hard whether the benefits of obstructionism really 
outweigh these risks. 
 
18 See Roy L. Heenan, Issues for the Dunlop Commission: The Canadian 
Experience, Contemporary Issues in Labor and Employment Law: Proceedings of 
New York University’s 47th Annual National Conference on Labor 351-84 (Bruno 
Stein ed., 1995).  
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S:  I am essentially in a “listen mode”:  This is an interesting 
idea, but I do not see how, especially in light of the EFCA 
experience, even if the Democrats one day again control both 
houses of Congress and the White House, we can get this past a 
filibuster in the Senate.  
V. EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
C:  I am glad you raised the issue of political agency.  This 
brings me back to Gompers 101.  We cannot hope to get any of 
the labor law changes we are seeking unless we can essentially 
form an alliance with some significant segment of employers.  
Employers, on the whole, see no need for labor law reform; 
they’re pretty much happy with a status quo that spells further 
decline in unionism.  So any alliance based on compromising 
some labor law issue—say, reform of 8(a)(2)—is not likely to 
provide enough “quo” for the “quid” we are seeking. 
What employers do want is some change in the litigation 
system for resolving employment discrimination and other 
employment claims.  It seems to me that there is some basis for a 
grand alliance here.  If we are prepared to support a change from 
a system based on using the courts to one based on using inside-
the-firm grievance and arbitration systems for resolving such 
disputes, we have something to offer that employers might find is 
worth the price of a more union-friendly labor law, say, of the 
“easy in, easy out” form.  
Many employers now are doing this on their own.  What we 
can offer is legal legitimacy through legislation approving of pre-
dispute grievance arbitration programs for all employment 
disputes, while still permitting administrative agencies to go to 
court to challenge systemic wrongdoing. 
What we also can provide is practical legitimacy for such 
programs, because union representation provides the benefits of 
expert advocates, institutional memory, and repeat player 
advantages—benefits that private lawyers often cannot provide, 
and certainly cannot provide at comparable cost.19  The Court’s 
decision in Pyett20 also opens a door here.   
 
19 See Samuel Estreicher, Beyond Cadillacs and Rickshaws: Towards a Culture 
of Citizen Service, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 323, 325–26 (2005). 
20 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
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A:  Intriguing stuff.  I have often thought that you missed 
your calling, and perhaps should have gone into academics.  
First, you want us to cozy up to employers.  Now, we are to sell 
civil rights down the river. 
We are a movement of the forgotten.  We are a social 
movement of the dispossessed.  In the happily now-distant past, 
we had a lousy record in some areas on civil rights.  One of the 
proudest moments for the labor movement was its decisive 
support of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even though that law 
created real problems for our construction unions and in many of 
our southern plants.21  I do not see how we can make this sort of 
deal with the devil without losing our institutional soul and our 
credibility with members and those whom we wish to recruit in 
the future. 
C:  Yes, some people lose under the proposal I have outlined: 
those who have high-value claims and can command the 
attention of high-priced trial lawyers.  Those folks will still have 
a claim, but they lose the opportunity to win big in the jury 
lottery.  The folks who gain are the average claimants, the folks 
who do not make enough to attract the plaintiff bar and who 
cannot afford an hourly fee that most competent lawyers 
nowadays require to initiate their services.  Today, we have a 
litigation system for employment disputes that offers a Cadillac 
for the few, but a rickshaw for the many.  In its place, we can 
offer a Ford for all, and, in the process, secure a rejuvenated 
labor movement for workers in private companies.22 
S:  I like the insistence on U.S.-made automobiles.  And I 
also find C’s ideas worthy of consideration.  I don’t see how we 
can even raise this stuff openly, and how we can survive the 
barrage of criticism we are likely to encounter from our 
colleagues in the civil rights community and plaintiff’s bar.  
Let’s continue the conversation over some stiff drinks. 
 
 
21 See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972 (1990). 
22 See generally Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication 
of Employment Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds., forthcoming 
2013).  
 
